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COMMENTS
Legitimate Classification and Nonpunitive
Confiscation: Avoiding the Bill of Attainder
Proscription
It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe
general rules for the government of society; the application of
those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty
of other departments.
-Chief Justice John Marshallt

A bill of attainder is a legislative enactment imposing punishment upon a named or easily ascertainable individual or group
without further judicial determination.* The Constitution of the
United States prohibits such enactments by Congress3or by state
legislature^.^ In Nixon v. Administrator of General S e r v i ~ e sthe
,~
United States Supreme Court held that Congress is not precluded
by the attainder clause from enacting a statute imposing burdensome consequences upon even a named individual, so long as the
person so identified constitutes a "legitimate class of one" and
the interference with his private interests does not rise to the level
of "punishment ."
This Comment will examine the Nixon decision and its impact upon the attainder doctrine as developed in prior cases. The
argument is not that the Nixon result is necessarily incorrect, but
rather that the analysis employed by the Court fails to adequately
address the issue of attainder. The doctrine as developed over the
years is overburdened with notions borrowed from equal protec1. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810).
2. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977); Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1866). Historically, the bill of attainder always
sentenced the attainted individual (or members of a group) to death. Any statute imposing punishment less than execution was termed a bill of pains and penalties. However,
early dicta, subsequently approved, established that the proscription of the Constitution
applied equally to both types of enactments; the term "bill of attainder" is used to denote
both. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Sems., 433 U.S. at 537 (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 447 (1965); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)
87, 138 (1810).
3. U.S. CONST.art. I, 8 9, cl. 3.
4. Id. 5 10, cl. 1. The Supreme Court has interpreted the provisions identically. See
Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377-78 (1866). This Comment will use the term
"attainder clause" without specifying the particular provision involved.
5. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
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tion doctrine that have a limited place in the attainder context.
The Nixon majority's approach represents the clearest example
to date of the extent to which attainder doctrine has become
encumbered with foreign concepts. In answer to the Nixon approach, this Comment suggests an alternative analysis based
upon the following definitions:
1. A bill of attainder legislatively imposes punishment
upon an individual or group whose activities or character have
been adjudged blameworthy by the legislature.
2. Punishment is either (a) the deprivation of an interest
afforded due process protection or (b) other burdens imposed
where consideration of all the circumstances indicates that the
legislature has exceeded purely regulatory purposes.

A. From Confederate Rebels to Communist Subversives
For the most part, the mere existence of the attainder prohibition has been sufficient to deter the legislature from such enactm e n t ~ After
. ~ the Constitution's adoption, three-quarters of a
6. The purposes for inclusion of the attainder clauses in the Constitution are open to
considerable conjecture, since there was no debate or opposition on this point. Attainders
confiscating land of Loyalists in the post-Revolutionary War era were rather common; it
has been suggested that the prohibition was included as an olive branch to Great Britain
RIGHTSIN THE
in the interest of renewed commerce. Z. CHAFEE,THREE HUMAN
CONSTITUTION
93-98 (1956).
Contemporaneous writings by the Framers are of little help in discerning the rationale
behind these clauses. James Madison referred to the proscription against bills of attainder
and e x post facto laws as a "constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and
private rights" and protection against "the fluctuating policy which has directed the
NO. 44, at 299 (Heritage ed. 1945). Alexander Hamilton
public councils." THE FEDERALIST
mentioned the bill of attainder provision as part of his argument that the Constitution
was the equivalent of a bill of rights, but he did not amplify this discussion to show what
NO. 84, a t
particular rights were intended to be protected by the clause. THE FEDERALIST
573 (Heritage ed. 1945). This view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 322-23 (1866).
The only extensive pronouncement by the Court as to the purposes behind the bill of
attainder prohibition focused on separation of powers and due process safeguards available in judicial determinations:
The best available evidence, the writings of the architects of our constitutional
system, indicates that the Bill of Attainder Clause was intended not as a narrow,
technical (and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition, but rather as an
implementation of the separation of powers, a general safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial function, or more simply-trial by legislature.

....
. . . [Vhe Bill of Attainder Clause not only was intended as one imple-

mentation of the general principle of fractionalized power, but also reflected the
Framers' belief that the Legislative Branch is not so well suited as politically
independent judges and juries to the task of ruling upon the blameworthiness
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century passed before the Supreme Court struck down an enactment as violative of the attainder clause.' Even then the offending provisions were not clear-cut attempts to single out a group
for punishment.
Two companion cases reached the Court in 1866. In the first,
Cummings v. Miss~uri,~
a Catholic priest challenged a provision
of the 1865 Missouri Constitution requiring an expurgatory oath
from those who sought to hold certain positions of trust. Teachers, clergymen, corporate managers, and trustees were all required to swear that they had not taken any part in the rebellion
against the Union. The second case, Ex parte Garland, involved
a similar oath required by federal statute with respect to attorneys admitted to practice before the federal courts. Since the
provisions absolutely excluded an ascertainable class of persons
(those who had participated in the Confederate cause) from
pursuing desired vocations, the Court struck down both requirements under the respective attainder clauses. The disability was
deemed a penalty and therefore punishment.
The Cummings decision adopted a broad approach to the bill
of attainder question. First, the Court recognized that such bills
need not be directed against an individual by name; they may be
directed against an entire class.1° Similarly, conditional imposition of punishment was no less prohibited than punishment absolutely imposed.ll Most importantly, the Cummings Court rejected any formalistic approach to the attainder analysis:
[Wlhat cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. The
Constitution deals with substance, not shadows. Its inhibition
of, and levying appropriate punishment upon, specific persons. . . . By banning
bills of attainder, the Framers of the Constitution sought to . . . [limit] legislatures to the task of rule-making.
United States v. Brown, 381 U S . a t 442, 445-46. Cf. Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 367 U S . 1,84-87 (1961) (finding no bill of attainder because power
to identify subversive groups delegated to an agency required to hold full hearings); De
Veau v. Braisted, 363 U S . 144, 160 (1960) (Congress may specify with respect to a prior
judicial determination of guilt).
7. Some early cases referred to the attainder clause tangentially, usually in very
broad terms. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U S . (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810) ("A bill of attainder
may affect the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or may do both.");
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 286 (1827) ("By classing bills of attainder,
ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts together, the general
intent [of the clause] becomes very apparent; it is a general provision against arbitrary
and tyrannical legislation over existing rights, whether of person or property.").
8. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
9. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
10. 71 U S . (4 Wall.) at 323.
11. Id. a t 324.
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was leveled at the thing, not the name. It intended that the
rights of the citizen should be secure against deprivation for past
conduct by legislative enactment, under any form, however disguised. If the inhibition can be evaded by the form of enactment, its insertion in the fundamental law was a vain and futile
proceeding.l2

As to the nature of rights protected against legislative deprivation, the Court recognized that punishment might include the
deprivation of "any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed,"
including "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."13
During the latter part of the 19th century, the broad language of the Cummings decision formed the basis of various unsuccessful attacks on statutes establishing minimum qualifications for the practice of professions.14 The leading case in this
period was Dent u. West Virginia15which upheld a licensing statute for doctors. In Dent, the Court reasoned that there was no
absolute bar to presently unqualified persons and that the statute
sought only to promote the health of citizens, not to punish anyone. A more difficult case from this era involved a bar from the
practice of medicine imposed on convicted felons. In Hawker v.
New York, l6 the Court sustained such a statute, despite its condemnation of an identifiable class, because the disqualification
was based on a prior judicial conviction.17
12. Id. at 325.
13. Id. at 320-22.
14. Dictum from the Ex parte Garland opinion had anticipated such attacks:
The Legislature may . . . prescribe qualifications for the pursuit of any of
the ordinary avocations of life. The question, in this case, is not as to the power
of Congress to prescribe qualifications, but whether that power has been exercised as a means for the infliction of punishment. . . .
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 379-80.
15. 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
16. 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
For a detailed examination of these and similar decisions and the distinctions upon
which they are based, see Comment, The Constitutional Prohibition of Bills of Attainder:
A Waning Guaranty of Judicial Trial, 63 YALEL.J. 844 (1954).
17. Accord, De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (upholding a New York statute
barring convicted felons from office in waterfront labor unions). In De Veau, the Court
observed:
The distinguishing feature of a bill of attainder is the substitution of a legislative
for a judicial determination of guilt. . . . Clearly, [this Act] embodies no
further implications of appellant's guilt than are contained in his 1920 judicial
conviction . . . . The question . . . where unpleasant consequences are brought
to bear upon an individual for prior conduct, is whether the legislative aim was
to punish that individual for past activity, or whether the restriction of the
individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation, such as the proper qualifications for a profession.
Id. at 160 (citation omitted).
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Eighty years passed after Cummings and Ex parte Garland
before the Supreme Court struck down another federal statute on
bill of attainder grounds. In United States v. Lovett,lBthe Court
summarily invalidated a provision of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 194319 denying compensation to three named
individuals who, in the view of the House Un-American Activities
Committee, were "guilty" of subversive activities. The case is
most notable, however, for Justice Frankfurter's concurrence that
rejected the attainder challenge but dealt a t length with the
issue.20Justice Frankfurter advocated a narrow, historical approach to the attainder issue, setting out his view of the necessary
elements as follows:
[I] All bills of attainder specify the offense for which the
attainted person was deemed guilty and for which [2] the punishment was imposed. [3] There was always a declaration of
guilt [4] either of the individual or the class to which he belonged. The offense might be a pre-existing crime or an act
made punishable ex post fact^.^'

Under Frankfurter's approach, the punishment element required
that the deprivation be retribution for past actsnZ2
Over the next fifteen years, Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Lovett cast a long shadow over several decisions involving "antisubversive" enactments in which the Court narrowed
the notion of "punishment." In American Communications Association v. D ~ u d sfor
, ~example,
~
the Court found no bill of attainder in a denial of access to the quasi-judicial National Labor
Relations Board when union officers refused to file affidavits denying present membership in the Communist Party. The Court
viewed the proscription as a requirement of conformity to present
standards, not as punishment for past acts. A "loyalty oath"
required of Los Angeles public employees was upheld as a reason18. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
19. Ch. 218, § 304, 57 Stat. 431, 450 (1943).
20. 328 U.S. at 318-30 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter concurred
only in the result: compensation for the three federal employees who had continued their
work despite the congressional attempt to cut off their pay. Frankfurter would have
allowed compensation on the basis of quantum meruit recovery in contract. Id. at 330.
21. Id. at 322-23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter was apparently
unaware of the English precedent for conditional attainders, e.g., the bill against the Earl
of Clarendon during the reign of Charles II cited in Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 324.
Frankfurter also failed to address the broad approach of the Cummings Court. See notes
10-13 and accompanying text supra.
22. 328 U.S. at 324.
23. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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able qualification in Garner v . Board of Public Works.24The
Garner Court distinguished Cummings and Ex parte Garland on
the grounds that the Los Angeles oath barred public employment
only, not entrance to an entire profession. In Flemming v.
N e ~ t o r the
, ~ ~Court found no attainder in denial of Social Security benefits to aliens deported for past Communist activities.
"[Mlere denial of a noncontractual governmental benefit" did
not constitute punishment .26
In Communist Party v . Subversive Activities Control
Board, 27 the bill of attainder challenge failed for lack of specificity
in the enactment. The Subversive Activities Control Act of 195028
had required registration of all "communist action organizations." The determination of what groups were subject to the
regulations was left to an administrative board empowered to
hold public investigative hearings and to issue registration orders.
The Court noted "constitutional significance" in the fact that
Congress did not name the Communist Party in the enactmentBZ9
Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion easily disposed of the attainder issue:
[The Act] attaches not to specified organizations but to described activities in which an organization may or may not engage. . . . I t requires the registration only of organizations
which . . . are found to . . . operate primarily to advance certain objectives. This finding must be made after full administrative hearing, subject to judicial review which opens the record
for . . . determination whether the administrative findings as to
fact are supported by the preponderance of the evidence.30

Implicitly, the Court recognized that the evil of attainder lies in
a lack of due process; that defect was avoided in this case through
the administrative hearing procedure.
The Warren Court's most significant bill of attainder decision resoundingly rejected the narrow interpretations of the cases
following Lovett. In United States v. Brown,31the Court struck
down section 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.32Section 504 was a substantially identical
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

341 U.S. 716, 722-23 (1951).
363 U S . 603 (1960).
Id. at 617.
367 U.S. 1 (1961).
Ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 (current version at 50 U.S.C. # # 781-798 (1970)).
367 U S . at 84-85.
Id. at 86-87.
381 U.S. 437 (1965).
29 U.S.C. # 504 (1970).
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replacement of the provision upheld in D o u d ~ Chief
. ~ ~ Justice
Warren's majority opinion seemed to signal a return to the broad
approach of Cummings. The Court noted that the attainder
clause "was intended not as a narrow, technical . . . prohibit i ~ n , and
" ~ ~rejected the notion that "punishment" required some
element of r e t r i b ~ t i o n . ~ ~
B.

The Nixon Decision

The recent case of Nixon u. Administrator of General
Services36is the first reexamination of bill of attainder doctrine
~ ' intense interest in other separaby the Court since B r ~ w n .More
tion of powers issues has relegated this aspect of the case to relative obscurity; Justice Stevens, however, saw such "serious questions" that his concurrence addressed only the bill of attainder
issue.38Particularly disturbing is the fact that the statute involved arose from a circumstance that typically surrounds traditional bills of attainder: a political crisis in which the object of
the legislation is an unsuccessful political foem3@
1. Background and posture of the case

In the wake of his resignation, former President Richard M.
Nixon entered into an agreement with the Administrator of Gen33. See note 23 and accompanying text supra. The Court noted that the provision
involved in Douds was factually distinguishable in that the new provision required affidavits denying Communist Party membership during the past five years. The Court stated,
however, that the Douds decision involved a misreading of the Lovett holding. 381 U.S.
at 457-58, 460.
34. 381 U.S. at 422.
35. Id. a t 458-60.
36. While several recent attainder decisions have split the Court 5-4 (e.g., Brown and
Flemming), the 7-2 Nixon decision would hardly seem to be close or controversial. Indeed,
on the attainder issue, the split may well have been 8-1 since Justice Rehnquist's dissent
addressed only the separation of powers issue. 433 U.S. at 545. The Chief Justice entered
the only dissent on the bill of attainder issue. Id. a t 536. Three justices, however, expressed
some serious reservations about the majority analysis. Justice White said that the Act does
not inflict punishment and simply cited his dissent in Brown. Id. at 487. But he also
questioned the applicability of the eminent domain "just compensation" rationale, a t
least with respect to some of the materials. Id. a t 487-91. Justices Blackmun and Stevens
both expressed hope that the congressional action in this case would not set a precedent
for future dispositions of Presidential materials. Id. a t 486, 491. These sentiments by the
concurring Justices indicate that some uneasiness exists among four members of the Court
about the nature of the congressional action.
37. At least twice in the interim, the issue was raised but not reached by the Court.
Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64,67-68 (1969); Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855,
864-65 (1966).
38. 433 U.S. a t 484 (Stevens, J., concumng).
39. See generally Z. CHAFEE,
supra note 6, a t 90-144.
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era1 Services, Arthur F. Samp~on,~O
to transfer to California the
materials accumulated by the executive branch during Nixon's
administration-including the infamous White House tapes. Mr.
Nixon was to have ultimate control over access to the materials.
The materials were to be perserved for three years (or, in the case
of the tapes, five years), after which time Mr. Nixon could remove
or destroy any materials he might choose. The remaining materials would be given to the United States after the establishment
of a Presidential library." In any event, all of the original tapes
were to be destroyed upon Mr. Nixon's death, but not later than
September 1, 1984.
At the request of the Watergate special prosecutor, President
Ford prevented execution of the agreement in order to facilitate
access to the materials necessary for the pending Watergate prosecution~.'~
Mr. Nixon filed suit to force implementation of the
agreement." Before that case was decided, however, Congress
took action to invalidate the agreement. Without holding a hearing, the Senate Committee on Government Operations voted out
Senate bill 4016, eventually enacted in 1974 as the Presidential
Recordings and Materials Preservation Act4' (the Act or the Preservation Act). The Act directed the Administrator of General
Services to obtain or maintain control of "the Presidential histori~ ~ Act provides that the
cal materials of Richard M. N i ~ o n . "The
40. The agreement was embodied in a letter dated September 6, 1974, and accepted
by Mr. Sampson on September 7, 1974. The letter is set out in its entirety as Appendix A
to the decision in Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107,160-62 (D.D.C.), stayed per curiam
sub nom. Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir.), motion to vacate stay denied per
curiam, 513 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1975), dismissed as moot sub nom. Nixon v. Sampson,
437 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1977).
41. The statutory basis for Presidential libraries denominates them "archival depositories." 44 U.S .C. 5 4 2107-2108 (1970).
42. Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107, 163-64 app. B (D.D.C.), stayed per curiam
sub nom. Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir.), motion to vacate stay denied per
curiam, 513 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1975), dismissed as moot sub nom. Nixon v. Sampson,
437 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1977).
43. Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C.), stayed per curiam sub nom. Nixon
v. Richey, 513 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir.), motion to vacate stay denied per curium, 513 F.2d
430 (D.C. Cir. 1975), dismissed as moot sub nom. Nixon v. Sampson, 437 F. Supp. 654
(D.D.C. 1977).
44. Pub. L. No. 93-526,88 Stat. 1695 (1974) (codified a t 44 U.S.C. $ 4 2107 note, 33153324 (Supp. V 1975)).
45. Id. § 101 (codified a t 44 U.S.C. § 2107 note). Section 101(a) of the Act deals
specifically with the White House tapes and directs that "any Federal employee in possession shall deliver, and the Administrator . . . shall receive, obtain, or retain, complete
possession and control o f ' such materials. Subsection (b) directs the Administrator to
"receive, retain, or make reasonable efforts to obtain, complete possession and control of
all papers, documents, memorandums, transcripts, and other objects and materials which
constitute the Presidential historical materials of Richard M. Nixon, covering the period
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materials be made available, as appropriate, to Mr. Nixon, executive agencies and departments, and the courts.46The Administrator is directed to issue regulations protecting the materials and
regulating public access for the protection of private interests
involved.47The Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia to hear challenges to the Act and regulations promulgated thereunder, and
grants docket priority to such suits? In the event that the court
should find a deprivation of private property, the Act authorizes
payment of "just c~mpensation.''~~
Title I1 of the Act5' created a
commission to study questions concerning records of all federal
officials .51
Former President Nixon immediately filed an action against
the Administrator of General Services challenging the Act's constitutionality and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.52Mr.
beginning January 20, 1969, and ending August 9, 1974."
Both subsections begin with this proviso: "Notwithstanding any other law or any
agreement or understanding made pursuant to [44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1970)l. . . ." Section
2107 authorizes the Administrator of General Services to accept for deposit Presidential
papers and historical materials "subject to restrictions agreeable to the Administrator as
to their use."
46. Pub. L. No. 93-526, 4 102,88 Stat. 1695, 1696 (1974) (codified a t 44 U.S.C. 9 2107
note (Supp. V 1975)).
47. Id. § § 103-104.
48. Id. $ 105(a).
49. Id. § 105(c). The Congress anticipated the constitutional challenges to the legislation and attempted to shore u p the weak points. In this particular instance, the intent
was to characterize the bill as an exercise of eminent domain power, contingent upon a
subsequent court determination that there had been a taking.
50. Title I1 of the Act was separately titled as the "Public Documents Act." Id. 8 201
(codified a t 44 U.S.C. 9 3315 note).
51. Id. $ 4 201-202 (codified a t 44 U.S.C. § § 3315-3324).
Republicans objected to the Act, pointing out the possibility of a bill of attainder
challenge for failure to make title I generally applicable even to all future Presidents. In
his lengthy comments on the Senate floor, Senator Hruska became the main exponent of
the constitutional objections. See 120 CONG.REC.33863-73 (1974).
Senator Griffin unsuccessfully sought to amend the Act so as to make it generally
applicable to federal officials. Senator Ervin, however, objected:
[Tlhe question of whether we would adopt a generic bill was considered fully
by the Government Operations Committee a t the time we voted to report this
bill. It was the unanimous agreement that we should not attempt to do so. . . .
If we attempt to put too much of a burden on one little nag that has to make
a speedy journey we prevent the necessary speed being made, and it might break
the back of the nag . . . .
120 CONG.REC. 33860-61 (1974).
52. With this second case pending, the first suit was decided on the grounds that the
Act invalidated the Nixon-Sampson agreement. Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107,124.
The district court's opinion covers almost 50 pages and seems overly long in light of the
pending action. Ultimately, the district court dismissed the first action as moot. Nixon
v. Sampson, 437 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1977).
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Nixon urged six grounds of unconstitutionality: (1)separation of
powers, (2) Presidential privilege of confidentiality, (3) privacy,
(4) freedom of speech and political association, (5) equal protection, and (6) bill of attainder. The three-judge district court
found the privacy claims most difficult, but upheld the Act on all
grounds." On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed.54
Justice Brennan's majority opinion systematically disposed
of Nixon's objections. The Act did not compromise separation of
powers principles, the Court observed, because the executive
branch retained control of the materials and became a party to
the Act upon the signature of President Ford.55A major factor in
the rejection of Presidential privilege, privacy, and first amendment association claims was the limited nature of the intrusion
by the archivists during the screening process coupled with the
safeguards to be incorporated in the regulations on access to the
materials? The equal protection challenge was not pursued on
appeal.='
2.

The Court's bill of attainder analysis

Justice Brennan rejected the bill of attainder challenge to the
Preservation Act, holding that Mr. Nixon constituted a
"legitimate class of one" and that any burden imposed upon him
was not punishment in the constitutional sense.58The decision
was based upon a two-pronged analysis derived from the definition of an attainder as a bill which (1)inflicts punishment without judicial trial (2) upon a specified individual or group.59Nixon
argued that the Preservation Act violated the prohibition against
bills of attainder because it was based upon a legislative determi53. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 433
U.S. 425 (1977).
54. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
55. Id. a t 441-46.
56. Id. a t 446-68. A detailed examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
57. The Supreme Court noted the abandonment of the equal protection reliance and
remarked that "mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law . . . ." Id. at
471 n.33.
For a more extensive treatment of these issues see 11 AKRONL. REV.373 (1977).
58. Id. a t 468-84.
59. The only definition of a bill of attainder in the majority opinion-"a law that
legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual
without provision of the protections of a judicial trialw-appears within the Court's summary of Nixon's argument. Id. a t 468. Therefore, it is somewhat ambiguous whether this
is the definition accepted by the majority or merely a restatement of the definiton urged
by Nixon.
,
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nation of his individual "blameworthiness.~~60
The Court characterized Nixon's interpretation of the attainder clause as a prohibition against undesired consequences imposed upon an individual
or group not defined at a proper level of generality. The Court
refused to extend the doctrine that far because to do so would
remove "the anchor that ties the bill of attainder guarantee to
realistic conceptions of classification and punishment?l Such an
approach, reasoned the majority, would prove unworkable since
any group subject to adverse legislation could complain that the
enactment lacked sufficient generality." The Court then proceeded to examine the specificity and punishment elements separately.
The specificity element was not satisfied because former
President Nixon constituted a "legitimate class of one." Congress
permissibly limited the scope of the legislation because his were
the only materials demanding immediate attention: he was the
only former President who had not yet placed his materials in a
library, and the tapes would be destroyed under the NixonSampson agreement upon his death.63The majority also considered the overall intent of the statute, looking at title I1 as an
indication that Congress intended similar regulation of other federal officials in the future.64
With respect to the punishment element of the analysis, the
majority adopted a multifaceted approach, recognizing that punishment may be discerned from a number of perspectives. First,
the Court applied a historical test: whether the deprivation or
disability of the statute is one traditionally associated with attainders, i. e., death,15imprisonment, banishment, property confiscation, or employment bar." The majority found the provision
in the Act for "just compen~ation"~
inconsistent with a finding
60. Brief for Appellant at 130-35.
61. 433 U.S. a t 470.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 471-72.
64. Id. a t 472. In so doing, the Court made a quantum leap. The National Study
Commission on Records and Documents of Federal Officials created by title I1 could only
recommend legislation relating to the preservation of such materials. Actual enactment
would require further affirmative action by the Congress.
The Study Commission report recommended that all materials created in public
service should be government property and that elected officials should be allowed t o
STUDY
COMMISSION
restrict access to the materials for a maximum of 15 years. NATIONAL
ON RECORDS
AND DOCUMENTS
OF FEDERAL
OFFICIALS,
FINALREPORT29-42 (1977).
65. See note 2 supra.
66. 433 U.S. a t 473-74.
67. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
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of "punitive confiscation of property."" Second, a functional test
looking to the type and severity of the burdens imposed was applied to determine whether the challenged law "reasonably can
be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes."" The Court
saw no implication of punishment, finding the Preservation Act
to be "nonpunitive legislative policymaking" based on legitimate
congressional interests in preserving both trial evidence and historically valuable records.'O A third test, characterized as
"motivational," was employed to consider "whether the legislative record evinces a congressional intent to punish."71The majority saw no reason to overturn the finding of the district court that
the legislative concern was focused not upon Richard Nixon but
upon the Nixon-Sampson depository agreement that Congress
perceived to be inimical to the public interest.72The Act was
therefore " 'regulatory and not punitive in character.' "73
In connection with the motivational test, Justice Brennan
examined a number of other considerations that he found to be
inconsistent with any punitive intent. First, the Act itself contains several provisions designed to protect Mr. Nixon's interests:
the right to access, regulations which permit any party to assert
legal or constitutional rights or privileges, and the assurance of
district court jurisdiction with docket priority." Mr. Nixon had
asserted that a less burdensome alternative existed whereby Congress could achieve its legitimate purposes;75the Court, however,
concluded that the suggested judicial inquiry pursuant to a mandated civil action would be "no less punitive and intrusive than
the solution actually adopted."76The Court also refused to make
inferences based upon the Justices' own "personalized reading"
of the social and political realities of 1974, and limited review to
the terms of the Act, the intent of Congress, and the existence vel
non of legitimate explanations for the law's effects.77
3.

The Burger dissent
The Chief Justice filed a lengthy, angry dissent accusing the
68. 433 U.S. at 474-75.
Id. at 475-76.
Id. at 476-78.
Id. at 478.
Id. at 478-81.
Id. at 478 (quoting the district court's opinion, 408 F. Supp. at 373).
Id. at 481-82; see notes 46-48 and accompanying text supra.
Brief for Appellant at 137.
433 U.S. at 482-83.
I I . Id. at 483-84.
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Court of becoming caught up in the passions of national crisis and
joining with Congress "[tlo 'punish' one person" in a manner
that "tears into the fabric of our constitutional f r a r n e ~ o r k . "His
~~
opinion addressed three issues-separation of powers, privacy,
and bill of attainder-where he saw well-settled principles bent
under the "hydraulic pressure" of pervasive political intere~t.'~
As to the bill of attainder challenge, the Chief Justice found
that title I of the Preservation Act clearly violated the constitutional proscription against "special legislation singling out one
individual as the target."" He articulated the necessary elements
of a bill of attainder as (1) a "specific designation of persons or
groups as subjects of the legislation" and (2) an "arbitrary deprivation, including deprivation of property rights, without notice,
trial, or other hearing?' Under Burger's analysis the specificity
requirement was met because Richard M. Nixon was named in
the Act. The sole remaining issue, then, was whether there had
been a legislatively imposed deprivation of an existing right.
Ownership of the materials became the pivotal issue under
Chief Justice Burger's deprivation analysis. He would have held
for Mr. Nixon on the basis of tradition involving former Presidents, including legislative action upon a presumption of presi~ involving a copyright on Presidential
dential o w n e r ~ h i pa, ~case
materials," and the practice of the Justices regarding their judicial papers.84The Chief Justice also perceived a statutorily vested
Presidential right to have a Presidential library at a location chosen by the President himself for deposit of such papers as he
-

-

78. Id. at 505 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
79. Id. (quoting Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (Justice Holmes had noted the tendency of great cases to make
bad law)).
80. Id. a t 537.
81. Id. a t 538-39.
82. Id. a t 539-41 (based on hearings on the establishment of Presidential libraries).
83. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, Circuit
Justice) (upholding a copyright in certain Presidential materials of George Washington).
The Folsom case was cited in an opinion given by Attorney General William B. Saxbe t o
President Ford. 43 OP. AIT'Y GEN. NO. 1 (Sept. 6, 1974). Saxbe's opinion concludes that
Presidential ownership of papers and historical materials "has apparently been the almost
unvaried understanding of all three branches of the Government since the beginning of
the Republic . . . ." Id.
84. An examination of the ownership issue is beyond the scope of this Comment. The
Chief Justice's decision, however, is not the inevitable result had the question been
reached by the majority. See Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107,133-45 (D.D.C. 1975),
stayed per curiam sub nom. Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir.), motion to vacate
stay denied per curiam, 513 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir.), dismissed as moot sub nom. Nixon v.
Sampson, 437 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1977); Ford & Pollitt, Who Owns the Tapes?, 6 N.C.
CENT.L.J. 197 (1975).
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might selectY Since these rights were established in Mr. Nixon,
Chief Justice Burger reasoned, the punishment element was satisfied by the Act's express denial of those preexisting interests.
The Chief Justice then proceeded to criticize portions of the
majority's analysis. He rejected any examination of congressional
motives as irrelevant to bill of attainder scrutiny, because
"retribution and vindictiveness are not requisite elements of a bill
of attainder" and because notions of prevention are not unknown
to the history of attainders.V3urger also attacked the idea of a
"legitimate class of one," arguing that the classification scheme
required the impermissible determination that either Nixon was
culpably deserving of the deprivation or that his uniqueness justified the confi~cation.~~
While the Nixon majority opinion represents the most welldeveloped analytic approach to the bill of attainder clause yet
espoused, the Court failed to adopt an analysis that adequately
reaches the evil of legislatively imposed punishment. This is not
to say that the result was necessarily erroneous, but rather that
the Nixon Court perceived the problem incorrectly. The confusion was the result of inconsistent holdings and reasoning in the
line of attainder cases since C u m r n i n g ~The
. ~ ~ vacillating treatment of the issue in these decisions indicates a failure to develop
a coherent, comprehensive bill of attainder doctrine.
The Supreme Court has satisfactorily, if somewhat vaguely,
defined a bill of attainder as a law that legislatively inflicts punishment upon an identifiable person or group of persons without
judicial trial? This Comment takes no exception to the basic
framework within which the Court's analysis proceeds. The Court
has stumbled, however, in the development of a clear conception
of the two particular elements: (1) specificity and (2) punishment?O The difficulty apparently arises from failure, or inability,
85. 433 US. at 541.
86. Id. at 541-42.
87. Id. at 543-44.
88. See notes 8-35 and accompanying text supra.
89. See note 59 supra.
90. One commentator has argued that the lack of procecural due process should be
regarded as a third necessary element. Comment, The Supreme Court's Bill of Attainder
Doctrine: A Need for Clarification, 54 CALIF.L. REV.212 (1966). This addition seems
superfluous, however, since such safeguards are, by definition, lacking whenever there is
a legislative imposition of punishment upon a specific individual or group. It is doubtful
that the author of that Comment would permit such a bill if the legislature instituted the
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to discern a pervasive policy behind the doctrine. This Comment
proceeds on the theory, espoused by the Brown majority," that
the attainder clause is a limit upon legislative power in the interest of due process. The safeguards available only in the judicial
process guarantee a fair trial. Therefore, the bill of attainder prohibition serves to buttress the separation of powers principle
embodied in the C o n s t i t ~ t i o nWith
. ~ ~ this concept in mind, this
section will critically examine the handling of each element with
particular emphasis on the developments of the Nixon decision.

A. Specificity
By prohibiting a focus on particular individuals, the bill of
attainder clause, viewed from a separation of powers perspective,
limits the extent to which Congress and state legislatures may
depart from making general ruled3 The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that Congress or state legislatures need not
always legislate for the whole world, but may attack specific
problems, or even parts of a problem, that the legislature may
deem to require immediate a t t e n t i ~ nIn
. ~equal
~
protection cases,
the doctrine of reasonable classification supplies the limit upon
state legislative or congressionalg5discretion. While the doctrine
of reasonable classification may be appropriate to legislative remechanism to provide, within the legislative process itself, the safeguards available at
judicial trial.
91. See note 6 supra.
92. See note 6 supra. Justice White criticized this idea in his Brown dissent:
[Tlhere are substantial reasons for concluding that the Bill of Attainder Clause
may not be regarded as enshrining any general rule distinguishing between the
legislative and judicial functions. Congress may pass . . . private bills. I t may
also punish persons who commit contempt before it. So too, one may note that
if Art. I, O 9, cl. 3 [the attainder clause applicable to Congress], immortalizes
some notion of the separation of powers a t the federal level, then Art. I, 5 10
[the clause applicable to the States], necessarily does the same for the States.
But it has long been recognized by this Court that "[wlhether the legislative,
executive and judicial powers of a State shall be kept altogether distinct and
separate . . . is for the determination of the State." Dreyer u. Illinois, 187 U.S.
71, 84.
381 U.S. a t 473 (White, J., dissenting).
93. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
94. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1955); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
95. By incorporating equal protection notions into the fifth amendment due process
clause, the Court has extended the equal protection concept to limit congressional discretion as well as state legislative discretion. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,
638 n.2 (1975) ("approach . . . precisely the same," citing cases). But cf. Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 & n.17 (1976) ("the two protections are not always
coextensive").
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strictions by regulation, the bill of attainder clause absolutely
prohibits the infliction of punishment upon designated individuals. Nevertheless, the reasonable classification doctrine has found
its way into attainder cases, and the Ninon decision undertook its
ultimate extension through use of the concept of a "legitimate
class of
Consideration of the types of cases raising the attainder issue
makes the intrusion of the reasonable classification doctrine at
least understandable. Only twice has Congress been bold enough
to name particular individuals as objects of public legi~lation.~~
Legislation has often sought to indirectly reach a particular group
without explicitly designating the class of persons affected: Several of the attainder cases have involved expurgatory oaths
whereby the "class" is ascertained when the individuals refuse to
By forcing the Court
purge themselves of the taint of legi~lation.~~
to examine the "classification" involved, such legislative schemes
have invited the Court to test reasonableness as well. Challenges
to statutes establishing qualifications for profesional practice
have relied on language in Cummings regarding reasonable relation to permissible state objective^.^ In dealing with these challenges, it was natural for the Court to employ reasonable classification analysis. But that the intrusion is understandable does not
justify the continued application of a deficient form of analysis.
A related and similarly defective analytic tool has occasionally been used by the Court. The Cummings Court had suggested
that a bill of attainder aims a t "the person, not the calling."lw
Subsequent decisions have predictably relied on this distinctionlol
-

-

96. 433 U.S. at 472.
97. See Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, 1943, ch. 218, § 304, 57 Stat. 431, 450
(the provision challenged in Louett); Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-526, § § 101-106, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974), (codified a t 44 U.S.C. § 2107
note (Supp. V 1975)) (the law attacked in Nixon). In 1940, the Senate rejected a Housepassed bill designed to deport Harry Bridges, an Australian communist labor organizer.
Z. CHAFEE,supra note 6, a t 146-47.
98. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. a t 437; Gamer v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S.
716 (1951); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Ex parte
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) a t 333; Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 277.
99. See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. at 119, 125-26; Hawker v. New York,
170 U.S. at 198.
100. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 320.
101. For example, the Court in De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960), upheld a
New York statute barring convicted felons from leadership positions in waterfront labor
unions. The issue, the Court observed, was "whether the legislative aim was to punish
[an] individual for past activity, or whether the restriction of the individual comes about
as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present situation." Id. a t 160.
In Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. a t 603, the Court relied on Cummings and De Veau
in restating the distinction as one between "the person" and "the activity and status."
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as a justification for a classification scheme. lo2 Even correctly
applied, this approach has only surface appeal since its application requires that the person and the "calling" be mutually exclusive. It is futile hair-splitting to separate an individual from his
"status" as a "legitimate class of one."lo3
Although the reasonableness criterion has appeared in attainder cases since the earliest decisions, its decisive application
in Nixon threatens the usefulness of the attainder doctrine as
distinct from equal protection principles. The Nixon Court paid
lip service to the fact that "the prohibition against bills of attainder . . . was not intended to serve as a variant of the equal protection doctrine,"lo4but failed to recognize that a simple variant
of equal protection doctrine is therefore inappropriate as the core
of the bill of attainder analysis. I t is difficult to hypothesize a
Id. at 614. The Court, however, became bogged down in a conceptual morass and incorrectly applied the test it had enunciated. Despite the unexplained inapplicability of the
deprivation to all deportees, the Court held that the denial of Social Security benefits to
those deported for subversive activities was the result of their present status as deportees,
not because of legislative concern with the activities that led to their deportation. Id. at
619-20. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan pointed out the misapplication of the
person-calling distinction. Id. a t 637-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102. The relationship between this distinction as an analytic tool and reasonable
classification doctrine is best illustrated by examining the context in which the language
appears in the Cummings opinion. There, the Court had observed that
[dualifications relate to the fitness or capacity of the party for a particular
pursuit or profession. . . . I t is evident . . . that many of the acts, from the
taint of which [these parties] must purge themselves, have no possible relation
to their fitness for those pursuits and professions. . . . The oath could not,
therefore, have been required as a means of ascertaining whether parties were
qualified or not . . . . It was required in order to reach the person, not the
calling.
71 U.S. at 319-20 (emphasis added).
103. The Supreme Court did not use the person-calling distinction explicitly in its
Nixon analysis, but it seems implicit in the argument that Congress was dealing with a
problem separate from Mr. Nixon himself. The omission might be explained by the authorship of the opinion by Justice Brennan, the dissenter in Flemming. See note 101 supra.
The district court disposition of the Nixon case did, however, apply the distinction. 408
F. Supp. a t 373.
104. 433 U.S. at 471. Since there was no equal protection clause a t the adoption of
the Constitution or in 1866 when Cummings was decided (the fourteenth amendment was
declared to be in force on July 28, 1868), such a categorical statement may be unwarranted. It seems that, absent the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court could have
made the attainder clauses a constitutional basis for an equal protection doctrine. The
decisions through Nixon, with language reminiscent of the rational basis test, reinforce
the notion that the two doctrines are somewhat related. The very broad approach of the
Brown case (involving political association) might be seen as analogous to the strict
scrutiny approach in fundamental rights areas under equal protection. It might also be
argued that Justice Frankfurter's "literalist" approach, advocated in Louett and subsequent cases, was an attempt to discard the attainder analysis because he felt that the
equal protection and due process doctrines protected essentially identical interests.
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situation in which Congress would single out a particular individual or group as the object of legislation without a legitimate concern for some permissible subject of regulation. Even should such
a situation arise, Congress would have little difficulty in formulating the enactment so as to appear to deal with some permissible legislative concern.
The reasonable classification doctrine incorporated in the
Court's attainder analysis became a major hurdle in the Brown
case. The government had sought to justify the disqualification
of Communist Party members from positions in labor unions by
analogy to conflict-of-interest laws, specifically section 32 of the
Banking Act of 19331°5that excluded persons involved in the securities business from positions as directors, officers, or managers
of Federal Reserve System banks.lo6Distinguishing the disqualifications proved most difficult and the Court's unsatisfactory handling of the issue contributed significantly to the influx of equal
protection language into the discussion of attainders. The Court
began by pointing out that the Banking Act did not aim a t a
political organization.lo7 Secondly, the Banking Act
incorporates no judgment censuring or condemning any man or
group of men. In enacting [ § 321, Congress relied on its general
knowledge of human psychology, and concluded that the concurrent holding of the two designated positions would present a
temptation to any man-not just certain men or members of a
certain political party. Thus insofar as § 32 incorporates a condemnation, it condemns all men.lo8

If the Court had stopped a t this point, perhaps the distinction
could have stood. Chief Justice Warren, however, went on to
attempt a rulemaking-specification distinction. The conflict-ofinterest law involved permissible rulemaking rather than specification, the Court reasoned, since "Congress merely expressed the
105. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1970).
106. The Court upheld this provision in Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441
(1947).
107. 381 U.S. at 453-54. One commentator has suggested that the Court's remark
should limit applicability of the attainder clauses to those laws which attempt to control
so-called subversive political groups, the traditional target of the English attainders. Note,
The Bill of Attainder Clauses and Legislative and Administrative Suppression of
"Subuersiues, " 67 COLUM.
L. REV.1490 (1967).
Such a political-nonpolitical distinction seems unnecessarily narrow. Should not the
clause a t least be an effective weapon in defense of any fundamental right? For example,
the attainder clauses seem clearly violated by an oath requirement for voting privileges
aimed a t a religious group. Cf. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (attainder issue not
raised in case involving an Idaho statutory provision disenfranchising Mormons).
108. 381 U.S. a t 453-54.
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characteristics it was trying to reach in an alternative, shorthand
way." "The designation of Communists as those persons likely to
cause political strikes," the Court observed, "is not the substitution of a semantically equivalent phrase; on the contrary, it rests
. . . upon an empirical investigation by Congress of the acts,
characteristics and propensities of Communist Party members."lo9 The Court's opinion did not explain how to determine
which classifications are permissible uses of "shorthand" or how
the enumeration of securities market personnel is "semantically
equivalent" to any characteristics permissibly reached. Justice
White's dissent correctly characterized the Court's action: The
Court struck down the labor statute because it was both overbroad and underinclusive in that it assumed that all party members were likely to incite political strikes and it failed to reach
nonmembers who would be likely to do so. Under such an analysis, the conflict-of-interest provision is indistinguishable.l10 The
problem stemmed from an examination, using reasonable classification terms taken from equal protection analysis, of the
"specificity element." A satisfactory distinction could have resulted if the specificity element had been held satisfied in both
contexts. Then the disqualification in the conflict-of-interest situation could have been held not to constitute punishment,
whereas the criminal sanctions imposed on Communist labor
union officials would clearly meet the punishment requirement.ll1
Likewise, to denote this element of the Nixon analysis
"specificity" does not clearly evince the thrust of the Court's
approach. This element, as perceived by the Court, involves more
than a mere designation of an individual or group as the object
of the legislation under scrutiny. Rather, the Court focused upon
the justifiability of the specific designation. Sufficient justification legitimizes the classification and the "specificity element" is
not satisfied.l12 The error of such analysis is easily exposed. The
Nixon majority would not have proceeded from their finding of a
"legitimate class of one" and allowed Congress to impose whatever sanctions it pleased upon Mr. Nixon such as imprisonment,
banishment, or confiscation of his San Clemente home. Clearly,
-

-

109. Id. at 454-55.
110. Id. at 463-68 (White, J., dissenting).
111. Quite apart from the attempt to distinguish the conflict-of-interest laws, the
Brown majority seems to have correctly perceived the purposes behind the attainder
provision: "The vice of attainder is that the legislature has decided for itself that certain
persons possess certain characteristics and are therefore deserving of sanction, not that it
has failed to sanction others similarly situated." 381 U.S. at 449 n.23 (emphasis added).
112. 433 U.S. at 471-72.
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the question of justifiability relates to the nature of the regulation
imposed. Therefore, any determination of legitimacy should be
confined to the analysis of the punishment element.
Application of a reasonable classification mode of analysis to
the specificity element fails to implement the separation of powers basis for the bill of attainder prohibition. Under a legitimate
class analysis, so long as the legislature can develop a case for
uniqueness of an individual and the circumstances sought to be
regulated, the Court has no check upon a legislative determination of individual culpability. The Brown Court recognized such
legislative evaluations as the true evil of attainder.l13 Any safeguards provided by judicial review"* will be illusory except in the
most egregious cases since the Court will look only for a
"reasonable basis" on which the legislature would have made its
determination.115

B. Punishment
The question of what constitutes punishment for purposes of
the attainder proscription has also given the Supreme Court considerable difficulty. The problem involves the tension between
necessarily imposed regulations, which may be applicable only to
a small segment of society, and burdens imposed selectively as
punishment. The Nixon case illustrates the convergence of these
competing forces. On one hand, Congress felt the need to prevent
destruction of the White House tapes; on the other, a judgment,
albeit implicit, that the former President was an unreliable custodian determined the form of the enactment.
Under the analysis adopted by the Nixon majority, the punishment element is satisfied by a positive result of the historical,
functional, or motivational tests. Justice White, it should be
noted, had argued for such a "multifold analysis" in his Brown
dissent.'16 Clearly, this analysis represents the most careful approach yet taken by the Court; nevertheless, significant problems
remain.
113. See note 111 supra.
114. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
115. As in the Nixon case, the legislative determination may have been made without
any hearing to allow input from the class affected by the legislation.
116. 381 U.S.a t 463 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White in turn lifted this suggested approach out of a nonattainder case that had relied on the attainder precedents,
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). Justice White refused to join
the opinion of the Nixon majority but concurred in the result, stating simply that the
statute did not inflict punishment and citing his dissent in Brown. 433 U.S.at 487 (White,
J., concurring). One might conjecture therefore that his failure to join the majority analysis is based on a disagreement over the approach to the specificity element.
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The historical test supposedly looks for those forms of punishment traditionally imposed by bills of attainder, i.e., death,
imprisonment, banishment, confiscation of property, and bars to
specified employment.l17Clearly, the historical standard is a convenient sample with which the enactment under scrutiny may be
readily compared. The American experience, however, shows that
the legislature is unlikely to impose any of the longstanding forms
of punishment. Significantly, the final type (disqualifications
from employment) is a relatively recent development, not established until Cummings. In fact, all three of the enactments struck
down as attainders since adoption of the Constitution have been
of this type, an extension of prior historical concepts of attainder
punishment. Therefore, the historical test is of limited usefulness
even if consistently applied.
The historical test loses whatever efficacy i t may have when
the Court refuses to confront the historical concepts directly. The
Nixon majority avoided the confiscation issue by confining the
historical notion to "punitive confiscations of property." The
majority seems to have opted for circumlocution-defining punishment as something "punitive." The only indication given as to
the application of this punitive-nonpunitive distinction was in
the Court's reference to the provision for "just compensation"
should the materials seized be determined to be Mr. Nixon's
personal property.l18 The Court clearly inferred that an exercise
of eminent domain powers could not be deemed punishment.
Such an interpretation is not surprising since it follows the standard rule of construction that two provisions of the same instrument must be construed, so far as possible, as consistent with
each other. It is surprising that the Court would base part of its
decision on an issue it did not fully address, i. e., whether the Act
would be a proper exercise of the eminent domain power since
such a taking must be for a public use.lLV
The functional test enunciated by the Court involves a n
analysis of "whether the law under challenge, viewed in terms of
the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said
117. 433 U S . at 473-74.
118. Id. at 475; see note 49 and accompanying text supra.
119. Justice White questioned whether some objects of the Preservation Act may
properly be taken under the eminent domain power. 433 U S . at 487-91 (White, J., concurring). Mr. Nixon's attorneys might be faulted for allowing the Court to skim over the
ownership and eminent domain issues. The latter issue was not argued in the brief; with
respect to the ownership issue, Nixon's brief spoke of "control" and "access" rather than
"ownership." Brief for Appellant at 140. Understandably, the Court seized on this language. See 433 U S . at 481.
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to further nonpunitive legislative purposes."120Ostensibly this
test is meant to check the legislature's ingenuity in devising new
forms of punishment violative of the attainder prohibition. The
standard apparently is the absence of any "legitimate legislative
purpose" rather than an actual examination of the severity of the
burdens imposed.121 The test so applied would cut too broadly.
Like the legitimate classification analysis applied to the specifity
element, the legitimate legislative purpose test is easily met, even
by contrivance. For example, the Ex parte Garland Court, which
had no historical basis for finding punishment in a bar to the
practice of a profession,122might have found that protection of
federal judicial integrity provided a legitimate legislative purpose. Likewise, had the Court in Brown narrowly construed
Cummings and Ex parte Garland (as finding punishment in a bar
to the profession for which the aggrieved party was trained), it
might have found a legitimate purpose in the protection of interstate commerce from political strikes. Addition of the least burto the functional test could
densome alternative con~ideration'~~
strengthen this portion of the analysis. This addition would provide a more defensible standard by which the type of burden
imposed might be measured. Although relevant as a factor in a
multifold analysis, the severity of the deprivation cannot be determinative. As stated in Brown, "the Bill of Attainder Clause
was not to be given a narrow historical reading . . . but was
120. 433 U.S. a t 475-76.
121. The authorities cited for the functional test are Cummings, Dent, Hawker, and
others where the actual test applied was whether the purpose of the disability (disqualification) was to reach the person or the calling.
Where no persuasive showing of a purpose "to reach the person, not the
calling," [cited Cummings] has been made, the Court has not hampered legislative regulation of activities within its sphere of concern, despite the oftensevere effects such regulation has had on the person subject to it [e.g., Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (deportation not punishment but
exercise of plenary powers of Congress over aliens)].
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. at 616. See also notes 100-03 and accompanying text supra.
122. Except, of course, the Cummings case decided the same day and relied upon.
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 377, 380.
123. Examined in Nixon as a "final consideration," Nixon's suggested alternative,
that the question of his custodial fitness might have been left to judicial determination,
was rejected by the Court as equally intrusive as the alternative selected. 433 U.S. a t 48283. In so doing, the Court missed the point that any determination of Mr. Nixon's unfitness would be made in the judicial context with the attendant safeguards. The Court made
a curious statement, almost as if an afterthought, to the effect that "if the record were
unambiguously to demonstrate that the Act represents the infliction of legislative punishment, the fact that the judicial alternative poses its own difficulties would be of no
constitutional significance." Id. at 483. The fact that the punishment issue is ambiguous
would seem to militate in favor of the judicial alternative as providing greater protection.

671

BILLS OF ATTAINDER

89

instead to be read in light of the evil the Framers had sought to
bar: legislative punishment, of any form or severity, of specifically designated persons or groups."lz4
The motivational test, while clearly sound,lz5seems to be of
limited applicability. The effect is merely to admonish Congress
to couch their enactment in carefully chosen language. Nevertheless, should Congress fail to exercise such care, a legislative history evincing a clear intent to punish should be dispositive of the
case without further analysis. The circumstances leading to the
Lovett decision would be of this type.lz6

C. Summary
The Supreme Court congratulated the Congress on its treatment of the Preservation Act challenged in Nixon; "the legislative history of the Act," the Court observed, "offers a paradigm
of a Congress aware of constitutional constraints on its power and
carefully seeking to act within those limitations."lz7 These plaudits referred to the provisions of the Act intended to avoid constitutional problems, i. e., "just compensation, Nixon's access to
materials, regulation to protect the rights of Nixon and others,
and the provision for judicial review. lz8 Unfortunately, similar
commendations are not due the Court.
The Court's present attainder doctrine is deficient in its approach to both identified elements. The weakness of the punishment analysis lies in both the limited utility of the historical and
motivational tests and the application of a minimum standard of
any legitimate purpose as the functional test. The specificity
analysis concentrates on a problem's uniqueness and severability
and fails t o recognize that those are the very characteristics which
make suspect the imposition of punishment upon the class so
identified.
"

124. 381 U.S. a t 447 (emphasis added).
125. A motivational test seems to go against the line of cases holding that the judiciary will not examine legislative motives. E.g., Barenblatt v. United States,,360 U.S. 109,
132-33 (1959); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,115 (1941); Arizona v. California, 283
U.S. 423, 455 (1931); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27,55 (1904). This rule, however,
seems to apply only when the legislature is clearly acting within its proper powers. See,
e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. a t 133. Penal legislation is one area where
scrutiny of legislative motive is apparently permissible. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
94-96 (1958).
126. See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra.
127. 433 U.S. a t 482 n.47. An alternative deduction is also entirely possible-that the
legislative history of this Act offers a paradigm of a Congress aware of the motivational
test and carefully seeking to avoid it.
128. See notes 46-49 and accompanying text supra.
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The present attainder doctrine, with its overreliance on equal
protection concepts, threatens to destroy the prohibition against
bills of attainder as a "bulwark against tyranny" distinct from
other constitutional safeguards. The pervasive concern with legitimate purposes and classifications obscures the underlying issue.
The emphasis is upon the ends sought, with insufficient attention
being given to the permissibility of the means. The question in
attainder cases should be whether or not the legislative branch
has determined with finality that a particular individual or group
deserves sanction that the legislature proceeds to impose without
the protections of due process.
An analysis effectively reaching the basic evil of attainders
must recognize that certain determinations are beyond "the peculiar province of the legislature"129no matter how legitimate the
legislative concern may be. Therefore, a restatement of the basic
definition of a bill of attainder is preferable: A bill of attainder
legislatively imposes punishment upon an individual or group
selected on the basis of essentially adjudicative criteria. The
analysis under this definition would continue to deal with the
same basic elements as the Court's present doctrine (specificity
and punishment), but with significant refinements necessary to
clarify the basic issues. This section will elaborate the suggested
analysis and demonstrate its application.

A.
1.

T h e Elements of a n Attainder

Specificity

Strict limitation of the legislature to general rulemaking
would require that any classification satisfy the specificity element. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized the necessity
and permissibility of enactments involving some specification in
order to meet particular problems.130Under the proposed attainder analysis, the specificity element is satisfied if the enactment
applies to a classification based upon a legislative determination
of adjudicative facts. 131
129. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
130. See note 94 supra.
131. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis first articulated the concept of adjudicative fact
in the context of administrative law in order to resolve the issue of what type of hearing
is required prior to agency action. 1K. DAVIS,ADMINISTRATIVE
LAWTREATISE
5 7.02, a t 413
(1958). The administrative law question is not entirely analogous to the separation of
powers problem underlying the attainder analysis, because administrative agencies gener-
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As used here, adjudicative facts are those requiring an evaluation of a particular party or its activities. Professor Kenneth
Culp Davis has explained that "[a]djudicative facts usually answer the questions of who did what, where, when, how, why, with
what motive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the kind of
facts that to go a jury in a jury case."132This definition, being
framed solely in terms of past activities, meets only part of the
problem in attainder cases. Such a limited view of the attainder
prohibition, long advocated by Justice Frankfurter, has been correctly rejected by the Court.133To accommodate the more expansive position, the concept of adjudicative fact must also include
those facts which answer the questions of who is likely to do
"what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent,"
when the answers depend upon some evaluation of character.134
In contrast to adjudicative facts, legislative facts are "general
facts which help . . . decide questions of law and policy and
discretion. "l" Legislative facts are those requiring no judgment as
to a party's character in terms of fault, culpability, motivation,
intentions, or voluntary propensities. The importance of the volially possess both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions and therefore the question
involves the choice of procedure within a single institution. In addition, administrative
procedure must conform to the statutory framework imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § § 551-559 (1970). In both situations, however, the concern is with
affording due process to those upon whom governmental power impacts. Therefore, it
would seem that the notion of adjudicative fact can be usefully adapted to the attainder
analysis.
The concept has been adopted for the Federal Rules of Evidence on the question of
judicial notice. FED.R. EMD.201. Cf. Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification:
A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALEL.J. 330, 352-54 (1962)
(suggesting that the legislature may make judgments based upon "judicially noticeable"
propositions).
132. K. DAVIS,supra note 131, § 7.02, a t 413.
133. See notes 20-35 and accompanying text supra.
134. See Wormuth, Legislative Disqualifications as Bills of Attainder, 4 VAND.L.
REV. 603, 610-15 (1951). The position of Professor Wormuth that character evaluation
violates the bill of attainder prohibition was criticized without further explanation as "but
a variant of the traditional 'punitive intent' test and subject to the same difficulties."
Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of
Attainder Clause, 72 YALEL.J. 330, 351 n.129 (1962). The Brown decision shows that this
is not the case. In Brown, the Court rejected the "punitive intent" test, but went on to
hold that the legislature had impermissibly evaluated the propensity of Communist Party
members to instigate political strikes. 381 U.S.a t 456-59.
An evaluation of propensities will no doubt rest in large part upon adjudicative facts
in Professor Davis' more limited sense. However, since these bases of classification are
rarely explicit in the enactments or even in the legislative history, they must be deduced.
To rely on the past activities definition alone would require one more level of implication
that the courts would be reluctant to make, in much the same way as the Court has tried
to avoid implying punitive intent.
135. K. DAMS,supra note 131, § 7.02, a t 413.
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tional aspect can be seen in the example of a law prohibiting the
issuance of driver's licenses to grand ma1 epileptics. By singling
out an identifiable group for sanction, the law clearly could be
punishment based upon the likelihood of some harmful occurrence; however, the law does not partake of the evil of attaind e r ~ . ~Classifications
"
by sex, race, national origin, physical characteristics, mental capability, income, or marital status are
usually based on legislative facts. The permissibility of such classifications is determined by application of equal protection doctrine. Here reasonableness and legitimate purposes, subject to
strict scrutiny in some instances, adequately serve to check legislative action.
As with most legal distinctions, there is a point where the line
is not easily drawn and the labels fail to supply a clear-cut solut i ~ n .For
' ~ ~example, the legislature may evaluate, in considerable
detail, particular parties or their actions where the concern is not
the parties themselves, but rather a more general situation with
a legislative view toward policy determination. The implementation of a zoning ordinance provides a good example. The adoption
of a comprehensive scheme requires study of current land uses
and may involve legislative determinations as to the future intentions of owners and others. The regulation may impose burdens
on only a few individuals whose identity may even be known to
the zoning authority. However, so long as the zoning plan is not
arbitrary and is enacted in the interest of public health, safety,
or general welfare, the legislature has acted properly.
In this borderline area, equal protection and attainder doctrines may seem to overlap. This can be seen in the challenge to
an Illinois custody statute excluding unwed fathers from the definition of "parent," thereby establishing a conclusive presumption
of unfitness. The Supreme Court struck down the enactment
under tortured equal protection scrutiny.ls8Arguably, this issue
136. See Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach
to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALEL.J. 330, 351-52 (1962).
137. professor Davis himself has said:
The distinction . . . is a useful one and often even seems to be an essential one,
even though in the borderland between the two categories the line is sometimes
difficult or impossible to draw . . . [and] often has little or no utility.
K. DAMS,supra note 131, 8 7.02, a t 414. See also Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing, " 123
U . PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268 n.6, 1269 (1975); Nathanson, Book Review, 70 YALEL.J. 1210,
1211-12 (1961). For an example of confusion about what constitutes "adjudicative facts"
in the administrative law context, see Schneider v. Whaley, 417 F. Supp. 750, 757
(S.D.N.Y.), modified, 541 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1976).
138. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 & n.10 (1972). This case is generally classified with the line of cases involving the much-criticized doctrine of "irrebuttable presump-
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might also have been framed as a bill of attainder challenge since
the classification was based upon a character evaluation of unwed
fathers. 139
The problems of the gray area between legislative and adjudicative facts are not fatal to the usefulness of the distinction in
the attainder analysis. First, the extent of the area of true indistinguishability is necessarily small, though perhaps not insignificant. Second, satisfaction of the specificity element simply serves
to trigger the rest of the analysis, and does not determine that an
enactment constitutes a bill of attainder. If the legislature has
arguably enacted a classification based on adjudicative facts,
then the requisite threshold specificity is present. Since notions
of specificity are included in the factors weighed under the disqualification branch of the punishment analysis proposed
below,140 a court sincerely troubled by the closeness of the
adjudicative-legislative distinction in a particular case might
adopt that portion of the analysis regardless of the type of burden
imposed by the statute under scrutiny. Finally, other troublesome distinctions pervade the law; and while they may have been
questionably applied in some, or even many, instances, they have
nevertheless provided a necessary foundation upon which the
decisionmaking process may proceed.
The analysis' specificity element will always be satisfied
where a particular individual or association is named in the legislation. The difficulty of determining the basis of such a classification requires such a result. Even where an otherwise permissible
reason for the sanction is expressed (e.g., "John Doe, because he
suffers from severe mental retardation, shall not be employed by
the State in a position of responsibility"), the inscrutability of
legislative intent generates uneasiness as to the real basis of the
enactment. To single out a particular person raises the presumption that the legislature meant to reach "the person, not the
calling."141 Similarly, it is conceivable that the legislature could
tions." The Supreme Court based this doctrine on the due process clauses, but it has been
argued that it is merely a variant of equal protection. See Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN.L. REV.449 (1975); Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV.L. REV.1534 (1974). See also 1976 B.Y.U.
L. REV.565.
139. Not all the cases treated under the irrebuttable presumption doctrine would be
susceptible to the bill of attainder analysis because they do not all involve a character
evaluation of the parties affected. E.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974) (involving mandatory maternity leave for pregnant school teachers).
140. See notes 151-65 and accompanying text infra.
141. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 320. See notes 100-02 and accompanying text supra.
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enumerate legislative facts to such a degree as to identify a particular individual. In such cases, the analysis must recognize the
substance of the situation created by the enactment.
2. Punishment

Specificity alone does not identify a bill of attainder; such an
enactment must also impose punishment. What constitutes punishment is not easily articulated and often depends on one's point
of view. That which the regulator sees as a necessary regulation
with incidental burdens may be perceived as a punitive sanction
by those subject to the restrictions. Attempts by the courts to
resolve the issue have culminated in the Nixon majority's threepronged analysis with its attendant difficu1ties.l" Under the proposed analysis, punishment involves (1)the deprivation of a recognized right, interest, or entitlement or (2) a disqualification or
bar which, in light of all the circumstances, exceeds the permissible bounds of regulation alone.
a. Deprivations as punishment. In the abstract, a deprivation is distinguishable from a disqualification only with considerable difficulty. For example, a statute establishing a law degree
as a prerequisite for admittance to the bar may be viewed either
as a deprivation of a "right" to pursue any chosen profession or
as a disqualification to those without the required diploma.
Therefore, the attainder punishment element requires a deprivation of a recognized interest, i.e., an interest traditionally protected by the courts. The distinction is between actions against
interests presently enjoyed and denials of requests or expectations. 143
Under this analysis, the deprivation-type punishment depends upon a historical test. But, unlike the Nixon historical
test, 144 this test involves the question of whether a given interest
has historically been afforded due process protection, not whether
the deprivation itself has been historically used as punishment.
Nevertheless, almost all of the historical attainder punishments
would fit under the deprivation rubric. Death, imprisonment,
banishment, and property confiscation are deprivations of pro142. See notes 116-26 and accompanying text supra.
143. See generally Friendly, supra note 137, at 1295-304.It is possible that a statute
might work to impose a deprivation upon certain individuals but a disqualification as to
others. In such situations, the court would be required to determine whether the disqualification constituted punishment and, if not, whether the applicability to the unattainted
class could be separated to save the enactment to that extent.
144. See notes 65-66 and accompanying text supra.
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tected rights in life, liberty, citizenship, and property, respectively. The loss of government employment (as in Lovettld5)also
falls within the deprivation category of punishment. The courts
have recognized public employment as an entitlement or type of
property interest entitled to some degree of due process protection.'" This notion of entitlement has expanded to cover many
nontraditional interests,ld7each of which could be subject to deprivation and thereby becomes a means of punishment.
While a party may have no "legitimate claim of entitlement"
to some potential benefit, but merely "a unilateral expectation"
or "abstract need or desire,"ldsa governmental bar to such future
enjoyment may constitute punishment under the disqualification
analysis. The attainders found in Cummings and Brown were of
this type. In both cases, the decisions used language reminiscent
of the equal protection rational basis test. However, comparing
these cases to Ex parte Garland, where a rational basis might
have been found,ld9it becomes apparent that the analysis requires
more than a simple application of equal protection doctrine.150
b. Disqualifications as punishment. The disqualificationtype punishment exists where the legislation serves to further
detectable punitive purposes-retribution, condemnation, prevention, and rehabilitation-as opposed to purely regulatory purposes-protection, prevention, and efficiency.151The factors bear145. 328 U.S. at 303.
146. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183, 191-92 (1952); cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (state law confers "certain
procedural rights . . . found not to have been violated in this case"); Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134 (1974) (dismissal for cause not a denial of due process rights created by the
employment agreement); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (one-year employment contract created no property or liberty interest for continuation of employment past
the end of the contract period). But cf. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886 (1961) (employment by private contractor on military base subject to summary termination by government administrative officer).
147. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (Social Security disability benefits);Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (school attendance); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535
(1971) (driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits); Caramico v. Secretary of HUD, 509 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1974) (tenant occupancy rights in property with FHA-insured mortgage). See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58
(1974).
148. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
149. See note 122 and accompanying text supra.
150. The Ex parte Garland Court adopted the Cummings analysis by reference. 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) at 377-78, 380. In addition, however, the Court dealt a t length with the
peculiar position of the attorney as an officer of the Court and the fact that the petitioner
had received a full pardon from the President. Id. at 378-81.
151. Prevention is listed as a characteristic of both regulation and punishment; but
there is a significant difference. Regulatory prevention anticipates a general situation,
while punitive prevention, apart from any general deterrent effect, focuses upon a particu-
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ing upon this determination may be roughly grouped into three
broad categories: (1)the class affected, (2) the burden imposed,
and (3) the legislative motivation.
The examination of the class affected partakes of some of the
same notions that are involved in the threshold specificity analysis. It should be remembered, however, that the specificity element has already been satisfied and that the statute therefore
adversely affects only a segment of the population selected on the
basis of past activities or an evaluation of some flaw in character.
This conclusion establishes a sort of presumption of irregularity
that may be overcome by the weight of other factors tending to
show the absence of punishment. The presumption grows
stronger as the classification moves along the continuum from
general to particular. In reality, there may be two specificity continua: one involving the size of the class and the other depending
upon the extent of adjudication involved. This latter adjudicative-legislative continuum is most important to the specificity analysis which decides that the enactment falls into the
adjudicative area. In determining whether the statute imposes
punishment, however, an explicit legislative finding of guilt
would have more weight than an implied legislative evaluation.
The numerical continuum is especially important at the inferior
extreme. The extreme case of a named individual should establish a nearly conclusive presumption of impermissibility. This
notion was recognized by Justice Stevens in his concurrence in
Nixon u. Administrator of General Services. 152 The type of specification might also be significant. For example, a specification
which implicated the exercise of constitutionally protected rights
would be more difficult to justify than one which did not, even
ignoring the other constitutional problems.
The nature of the burden imposed is relevant with respect to
the relationship of the disqualification to the classification, the
type of burden imposed, the feasibility of less burdensome alternatives, and the reasonableness of the expectations thwarted.
That the classification scheme must have a rational relationship
to the burdens imposed was established in the first attainder
case153and further elaborated to include notions of overinclusiveness and underinclu~iveness.~~~
The difficulty in the Nixon
lar individual after a determination of guilt or fault.
152. 433 U S . at 484-86 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also United States v. Brown,
381 US.at 463,475 (White, J., dissenting); Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALELJ.330,356 (1962).
153. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U S . (4 Wall.) at 319-20.
154. See note 110 and accompanying text supra.
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analysis grew out of its sole reliance on these equal protection
concepts-not that such considerations are wholly inapposite.
The type of disability created by the legislation under scrutiny is also relevant. Affirmative disabilities tend to be more punitive in nature than surmountable restraints.lJ5 Similarly, the
disability which acts as a complete bar is more severe than one
which may be avoided by a choice between two positions. While
severity of the disability is not determinative of punishment,lJ6
the incorporation of a sanction disproportionate to nonpunitive
purposes would be strong evidence of impermissibility.lJ7 The
availability of less burdensome alternatives that would satisfy the
legitimate purposes behind the enactment would also be a relevant consideration.ls8The area in which the disability occurs
could determine the reasonableness of private expectations and
the permissibility of legislative interference. For example, greater
legislative control of a heavily regulated industry would tend to
support a system of qualification. On the other hand, a prisoner's
expectation of parole, while not a right, is not unjustified in light
of current practice.lJgThe Ex parte Garland opinion implied that
the scope of legislative control in a particular field could be a
pertinent consideration. There, the Court dealt with the special
status of attorneys as officers of the court as an indication of
improper congressional action in an area of nonexclusive jurisdiction.lsO
Finally, to the extent it can be discerned, the legislative motivation behind the enactment may be evidence of impropriety.
This factor comprises the third test of the Nixon decision with its
examination of legislative history for evidence of punitive intent.161 In addition, however, the political climate in which the
legislation arises deserves consideration. While the Nixon Court
refused to indulge in "personalized reading of the contemporary
scene or recent history,"lMprevious courts have not been so reluctant. The Cummings majority explicitly referred to the passions
155. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,372 U.S. 144,168-63 (1963). Compare American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) with United States v. Brown, 381
U.S. at 437.
156. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. at 616 n.9.
157. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
158. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 482-83.
159. While the legislature might decide that all those convicted of certain crimes
should not be eligible for parole, a law denying parole to a particular convict would seem
to involve impermissible adjudication by the legislature.
160. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 378-80.
161. 433 U.S. at 478.
162. Id. at 484.
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aroused by the Civil War and their inevitable influence on the
1 e g i ~ l a t u r e . lThis
~ ~ reference was mentioned approvingly in
Flemming. lB4 The Brown opinion also took note of the traditional
utilization of bills of attainder to reach possible political foes.lB5
None of the foregoing factors, considered alone, is determinative of a punitive disqualification. Such a finding must rest upon
the impression derived from consideration of them all, weighed
against the individual's right to due process.

B. A n Illustrative Application of the Proposed Analysis
The soundness of any legal analysis depends to a certain
extent upon its ability to harmonize the results of prior cases or
to point out explainable error in isolated instances. As an illustration, the foregoing proposal as applied to the facts of the Ninon
case will be contrasted with its application to the conflict-ofinterest provision of the banking regulations that posed such difficulty in Brown. The analysis does not promise a clear-cut conclusion from any particular set of facts, but it is hoped that the
"specification of the relevant factors may help to produce more
principled and predictable decisions."166
The requisite specificity is present in both cases. The Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act singles out the
administration of Richard M. Nixon for special treatment and
therefore partakes of the problems of enactments with named
individuals. In addition, however, the legislation rests upon a
judgment by the Congress that Mr. Nixon would be likely to
handle his Presidential materials so as to preclude the discovery
of the truth behind the Watergate scandal if such evidence could
be found in the materials. Similarly, the conflict-of-interest law
focuses upon persons holding particular positions as likely to mismanage bank affairs, and therefore impugns the character of
those persons.
The punishment analysis of the Ninon situation depends on
several contingencies, an in-depth treatment of which is beyond
the scope of this Comment. First, the Court could have found that
the former President owned the materials.16' Given such a result,
163. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) a t 322.
164. 363 U.S. a t 615.
165. 381 U.S. a t 453. In light of these precedents, it is somewhat ironic that Justice
Stevens was willing to take judicial notice of the political events surrounding the Watergate affair as a justification for the statute under scrutiny in Nixon. 433 U.S. a t 486
(Stevens, J., concurring).
166. Friendly, supra note 137, a t 1278.
167. See note 84 supra.
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the eminent domain provisions of the Act would come into play.
If the materials were taken for a legitimate "public use," the
analysis would end since there is no confiscation of property in
the strict sense, but rather an exchange for just compensation.
Failure to find a "public use" would result in a finding of a bill
of attainder because there would be a deprivation of a recognized
property right. Second, the Court might have found that Mr.
Nixon had no recognized right in the property. Nevertheless, in
light of the treatment afforded other Presidents and federal officials under de facto practice and the statutory provisions for the
creation of Presidential libraries, the confiscation might still constitute a bill of attainder under the punitive disqualification rubr i ~ .The
' ~ ~Act focuses upon a single individual, thereby raising a
very strong presumption of impropriety. While legitimate purposes for the regulation and its narrow applicability have been
articulated, clearly less burdensome alternatives could have accomplished the desired result. For example, a statute might have
prohibited destruction or alteration of any Watergate-related
materials and required prompt establishment of a depository
Presidential library. Third, the Act grew out of the political turmoil of Watergate and targeted the ultimate victim of the scandal. On balance, the legitimate ends sought seem outweighed by
the punitive character of the enactment.
On the other hand, the conflict-of-interest law involves no
deprivation of a recognized right. While a person might aspire to
occupy a position of bank responsibility, this aspiration is a
"unilateral expectation or desire." Under the disqualification
analysis, the degree of specificity is relatively broad in the numerical sense and rationally related to the desired regulation. The
disqualification is not absolute because it may be overcome by
resignation from the position of perceived conflict. The banking
industry is also heavily regulated in all of its aspects; therefore
the disqualification is part of a pervasive regulatory system, not
an isolated attack upon a class. There is no evidence of an intent
to punish those working in the securities market. Finally, the
enactment arose from an economic rather than a political crisis.
The Flemming decision perhaps deserves a parenthetical
comment. There, the Court noted that a deprivation of a
"noncontractual governmental benefit" did not constitute punishment? Subsequently, the Supreme Court recognized the no168. The disqualification involved would be a denial of custody and possession of the
materials and power over their future disposition.
169. 363 U.S. at 617.
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tion of entitlement that would probably be applicable to Social
Security retirement benefits.170Under the proposed analysis, the
deprivation there would satisfy the punishment element, and the
statutory provision would fail as a bill of attainder.
The major attainder cases may be reconciled by application
of the proposed analysis. The exceptions are the cases involving
the antisubversive enactments that passed Court scrutiny after
Lovett and that were essentially overruled by the Brown decision.171It is hoped that the proposed analysis provides a comprehensive framework for handling subsequent cases without undue
emphasis on any particular consideration lifted from prior decisions in isolation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's development of the bill of attainder
doctrine has suffered from the irregularity with which such cases
have arisen. The major cases, while probably correct in result,
have lacked a desirable cohesiveness that would come from a
consensus about the interests intended to be protected by the
attainder prohibition. Therefore, the opinions seem to flow as an
afterthought from a decision reached on the basis of intuitive
reaction to the challenged enactment in light of general notions
about the nature of attainders. The opinion writers have adopted
language developed elsewhere that fits nicely as applied to the
case at hand. When the Nixon Court attempted finally to articulate a definitive analytic structure, familiarity with equal protection concepts resulted in a formulation of the attainder doctrine
providing little distinguishable protection.
Due process, as structually guaranteed by the separation of
powers, in the evaluation of activities, motives, and propensities
of individuals provides the best foundation for a workable and
truly separate bill of attainder analysis. The experience of almost two centuries does not serve as a sufficient check on a legislature intent on punishing an unpopular individual or group. The
courts must assume this protective responsibility. In the words
of Professor Chafee:
If legislators are determined not to be guardians of the liberties
of the people and if judges refuse to interfere when legislators
take those liberties away, what is the use of putting guarantees
of fundamental rights into the Constitution except, perhaps, to
170. See note 147 and accompanying text supra.
171. See notes 23-35 and accompanying text supra.
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furnish political orators with noble words to quote while they tell
us Americans to thank God that we are not as other men are?"*

A comprehensive attainder doctrine, designed to shield the vital
right to a judicial determination of guilt or fault, can effectively
meet this challenge.
The analysis suggested by this Comment emphasizes the
nature of both the classification scheme and the interest interfered with. Legislative specificity based on individualized evaluations are inherently suspect. Rights and entitlements traditionally afforded due process protection in other contexts may not be
denied on the basis of such evaluations. Other burdens imposed
upon such censured parties must have strong justification in a
permissible, nonpunitive scheme of general regulation. This justification must be found after consideration of all the surrounding
circumstances. Such a formulation of the analysis is necessary to
prevent legislative punishment masquerading as regulation behind the presumptive disguise of rational basis and legitimate
classification.
Carl F. Huefner
172. Z.CHAFEE,
supra note 6,at 161.

